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Abstract
We analyze the dynamic interaction between civil society organizations
and Government in a representative developing economy. Government fa-
vors corruption and so fails to build e±cient institutions. On its side, civil
society exerts pressure on Government to constrain it to halt corruption.
We distinguish between an authoritarian Government and an unrestrictive
one: the latter does not repress society's protests while the former imple-
ments punishment mechanisms. We demonstrate analytically the existence
of a unique stable equilibrium by solving a linear quadratic di®erential game
for three Regimes respectively the optimal control problem, noncooperative
and cooperative games. Numerical assessment indicates that civil moni-
toring always increases as corruption increases, but civil monitoring is low
and institutions improve much faster under cooperation. Furthermore, total
factor Productivity e®ects always dominate the detrimental e®ect of civil
monitoring on growth in the ¯rst regime, under some restrictions in the
second and never in the third. In response to a change in the government's
aversion to rent variations in the presence of authoritarian government, total
factor productivity e®ects always dominate under both the noncooperative
and cooperative scenario.
1Electronic address: fabien.ngendakuriyo@uclouvain.be. We gratefully acknowledge ¯-
nancial support of the Belgian research program, PAI P6/07 Economic Policy and Finance
in the Global Equilibrium Analysis and Social Evaluation. We also acknowledge Raouf
Boucekkine for helpful discussions and comments.
11 Introduction
Recently, numerous studies in institutional economics have highlighted the
importance of institutions for growth and economic development by the fact
that good institutions make the economic environment more e±cient. How-
ever, some practices undermine the strength and e®ectiveness of institution:
corruption, lack of law, inconsistency of some rules, incompetence, etc. In
these situations, weak or poor institutions create uncertainty, bad gover-
nance and lead to low growth.
Despite the multitude of studies available up to now, the relevant litera-
ture shows no consensus on way to conceptualize the institutions' quality or
the occurrence of institutional change. Several of them mention the impor-
tant role of a political actor (State or Government)in implementing e±cient
institutions [Zak (2000), Leukert (2005), Francois (2006)]. However, the
role of the State is speci¯cally contextualized. In developing countries with
a quasi-absence of private saving, the government is the largest investor in
the economy. Then, both production and labor markets are controlled by
the government. What if the government fails to build e±cient institutions?
0ur goal is to build a theoretical framework of institutional change within
a developing country where governmental corruption is a source of institu-
tional weakness.
Economic theory has developed two basic views of corruption respec-
tively exogenous and endogenous corruption to the political process. The
¯rst type is modelled following the principle-agent approach based on the
assumption of the existence of an asymmetry of information between princi-
pals (politicians or decision makers) and agents ( civil servants); the second
type means institutionalized corruption since it involves the political regime.
Analyzing corruption as an endogenous phenomena is more realistic, but up
to now it has not provided a clear analytical framework for the level and
structure of corruption (Begovic, 2005). The contribution of this investiga-
tion is an attempt to o®er a way to conceptualize an analytical framework for
endogenous corruption in the light of New Institutional Economics [North
(1990), Rodrik (1999)], which considers institutions as endogenous phenom-
ena.
We explore this issue by modelling the role of an active civil society
in building good institutions. As indicated in the literature, Civil soci-
eties are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, non-
governmental development organizations, community groups, women's orga-
nizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trades unions,
self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and ad-
2vocacy groups2. Summarizing the key elements describing civil society, the
Association for Research and Promotion of Participative Democracy in East-
ern Europe (AREDA) stipulates that: " The Civil Society is the totality of
groups (NGOs) and individuals in a country, who show a regular concern
for the social and political context in that country, without ful¯lling the
function of political parties, who are autonomous from the government, and
to whose goals also belongs to monitor the activity of the government or
certain speci¯c consequences of it, as well as to resist - if possible peacefully
- any unlawful, dangerous or abusive government activity" (AREDA, 2003).
Skidmore (2001) argues that civil society in developing countries may
play an important role in promoting good governance since it helps to build
e®ective and accountable States and supports voices for changes and that
even consumers sometimes join or contribute to organizations that advocate
their interests.
In reality, the appearance and proliferation of civil society organizations
throughout the world can be seen as a request for e±cient institutions ad-
dressed to public authorities. Accordingly, civil society can be interpreted
as a sphere that evolves largely in response to the inability or failure of the
State to meet the needs or demands of its citizens (Hyden, 1997). Ordi-
nary citizens may then combine their e®orts to build strong civil society as
a coalition of organizations who react strongly to anti-productive Govern-
mental activities either, in Hirschman's (1970) terms, by voice or by loyalty.
According to Hirschman (1970)3 and Dowding et al (2000), civil society can
either protest ( voice) against a corrupt Government, stay silent (loyal) or
exit. Hirschman (1970) de¯nes the voice option as
" Any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an
objectionable state of a®airs, whether through individual or collective
petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to higher
authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or through
various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to
mobilize public opinion".
In this paper, the exit option is avoided since we want to model the role of ac-
tive civil society in ¯ghting corruption. Civil society still has two strategies:
voice or loyalty. On its side, Government can repress or tolerate any attempt
2This characterization is commonly used by the World
Bank (http://www.worldbank.org), International Monetary Found
(http://www.imf.org), Centre for Civil Society at London School of Economics
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/collection/CCS), etc
3Hirschman suggests there are two consumer reactions to a decline in product quality:
exit and voice, which interact with a third, loyalty.
3at revolt by handling its mechanisms of repression: the police force, prison,
courts of justice and administrative constraints such as the prohibition of an
association within national territory. AREDA adds that governmental hos-
tility can lead Governments to create and ¯nance an arti¯cial civil society
in order to deter the pressure of active organizations. Authoritarian govern-
ments adopt repressive strategies to reinforce its capacity to create rents;
less bad governments act passively by not employing punishment mecha-
nisms against the protests of civil society.
Below, we explore actual civil society monitoring activities, using the
following historical examples of e®ective actions across the World:
1. From the OECD experience, we learn that various civil society orga-
nizations such as BIAC, TUAC, ICC and TI4 supported the process
which led to the adoption of the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public O±cials in International Business Transactions in 1999.
Civil society organizations provide useful links between public actors
and the business community and contribute to maintaining pressure
on governments to ful¯l their commitments (Hors, 2003)
2. The Initiative Policy Dialogue founded in July 2000 by the Nobel lau-
reate economist Joseph Stiglitz is a collaborative e®ort among nearly
200 leading economists, political scientists, policymakers and civil so-
ciety representatives from developed and developing countries. Its ef-
forts are intended to help countries ¯nd solutions to pressing problems
and also to strengthen their institutions and civil societies (Columbia
University, www.gsd.columbia.edu)
3. Through the Strengthening Civil Society Monitoring Capacity in Moldova
(SCSMCM) program, IREX (International Research and Exchanges
Board) supports journalists, media outlets and media non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in their "watch-dog" role as the Moldovan gov-
ernment undertakes reforms to reduce corruption as part of its com-
mitment to the Millennium Challenge Corporation Country Threshold
Program. (www.irex.org)
4. Civil society in Uganda has used a combination of approaches to the
¯ght against corruption. These include: formation by 40 Civil so-
ciety organizations of an Anti-Corruption Coalition (ACCU) to or-
4BIAC, TUAC, ICC and TI respectively stand for Business and Industry Advisory
Committee, Trade Union Advisory Committee, International Chamber of Commerce and
Transparency International
4ganise jointly the ¯ght against corruption ( ACCU organizes an anti-
corruption week in October countrywide); promoting public education
and the mobilization of people to demand the accountability of public
o±cials and to resist corruption at all levels (Uganda Debt Networks
is an example of a CSO working in this domain); establishment of a
Centre for Corporate Governance to ensure ethical behaviour to corpo-
rations in their business dealings; involvement of CSOs in monitoring
the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) through which the funds from debt re-
lief and other donors are channelled to eradicate poverty; coordination
between CSOs and Government for e®ectiveness in the ¯ght against
corruption (Gariyo, 2001).
5. In Bulgaria, administrative corruption was slashed to half its 1998 level
after the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) and the Coalition
2000 it founded managed to bring anti-corruption e®orts to the fore-
front of the policy agenda and to make the public less tolerant of rent
seeking by public o±cials (Islam, 2008).
These examples illustrate the monitoring role of civil society in installing
good governance by combating corruption. Consequently, we construct a
theoretical dynamic game between government and civil society to explore
their interaction in the economy. We distinguish between competitive play
and cooperative arrangement. Three regimes are considered: Regime 1 and
Regime 2 re°ect the competitive play, while Regime 3 is the cooperative
mood. In Regime 1, active or loyal civil society interacts with passive gov-
ernment; Regime 2 invokes the dynamic con°ict between active civil society
and an oppressive government.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to
the model of competitive interaction. In section 3, we present the model of
cooperative arrangement and in Section 4, we assess numerically the robust-
ness of theoretical results before concluding in Section 5.
2 The model of competitive interaction
Let us consider a developing country with substantial public involvement
in the production sector. The private sector is not su±ciently developed
to dominate the economy. Hence, the quality of institutions depends on
government behavior. Government owns the ¯rms owner. The economy is
populated by a continuum of identical consumers who inelastically supply
5labor to produce output according a standard production function
Yt = AtF(Lt)
such that At > 0; F0 > 0, F00 < 0. At is the total factor productivity
(TFP) through which institutions enter the production sector as an exter-
nality. We assume that the economic environment, characterized by the
prevailing institutional structure of the economy, exerts a positive indirect
e®ect on output. Formally,
@Yt
@At
= F(Lt) > 0 and AI =
@At
@It
> 0 where It
is the institutional quality index of the economy5 .
Following Leukert(2005)6, we assume that institutional quality It evolves
over time according to the following law of motion
_ It = bwt ¡ ±It (1)
where ± is the depreciation rate. This indicates that if consumers do not
care about improving institutions, they deteriorate at rate ±. The parameter
b captures the e±ciency of civil monitoring activities.
Consumers' participation in civil society implies that some labor is used
outside the production sector. Assume the time available to each consumer
is normalized to one. Then, the time constraint for consumers is Lt+wt = 1
For any date t, it is assumed that a proportion Á of total production
is stolen by the government. The function Á is endogenous and depends
negatively on the e®ort wt devoted to improving institutions by civil society
(consumers) and positively on the pressure xt Government exerts on civil
society. In the other words, the function Á shows the corruption technology
of the government and 0 < Á < 1.
The level of consumption at time t is then Ct = (1 ¡ Á(wt;xt))Yt and
the production function becomes
Yt = AtF(Lt) or Yt = AtF(1 ¡ wt)
5The total factor of productivity At = A(It;zt) where It is the institutional quality
and zt a vector of other factors
6Leukert(2005) indicates that agents decide how much e®ort to invest in improving the
informal institutions at each point in time. The change of formal institutions is the job of
the State whose aim is to instill the good habits. In our case, Government is corrupt and
we assume that the improvement of institutions will happen through the existence of an
active civil society through which each consumer acts in order to constrain the government
to build e±cient institutions.
6This set up implies that civil monitoring has two opposite e®ects on out-
put: an indirect positive e®ect of w on y (TFP e®ects through institutional
improvement) and a detrimental direct e®ect of w on y since an increase in w
reduces the time devoted to production activities. The total e®ect depends
on which impact dominates.
We begin by analyzing the case where civil society can protest (voice)
or can be loyal in the presence of a non-authoritarian corrupt government.
This case refers to a one-player di®erential game or a simple optimal control
problem.
2.1 Active or loyal civil society versus passive government
In this Regime 1, corruption technology depends only on civil monitoring w:
Át = Á(wt). A representative consumer's dynamic problem with discounting
at rate ½ can be formulated as
Maxwt
R 1
0 exp(¡½t)U(Ct)dt, subject to Equation (1)
with 0 · wt · 1. This relation leads to two inequality constraints:
g1 ´ w ¸ 0 and g2 ´ 1 ¡ w ¸ 0
The corresponding current value of the Hamiltonian is given by:
H(wt;It;¸t) = U[(1 ¡ Á(wt))AtF(1 ¡ wt)] + ¸t[bwt ¡ ±It]
where ¸t denotes the co-state variable associated to (1).
The optimality conditions consist of the law of motion of institutional
quality index (1) and
¡ UcÁ0(w)Y ¡ Uc(1 ¡ Á(w))AF0
L + ¸b = 0 (2)
(1 ¡ Á(w))UcF( ~ K;1 ¡ w)AI ¡ ±¸ = ½¸ ¡ _ ¸ (3)
lim
t!1
¸tIt = 0: (4)
Equation (4) gives the transversality condition. Since the problem above
is an inequality-constraint problem, we need to invoke the Kuhn-Tucker nec-
essary conditions. Thus, the current-value Hamiltonian is augmented into a
Lagrangian function as follows
7L(wt;It;¸t;¹1t;¹2t) = H + ¹1twt + ¹2t(1 ¡ wt)
First order conditions (FOCs), known as Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
maximizing L, are given by7
Lw ´ ¡UcÁ0(w)Y ¡ Uc(1 ¡ Á(w))AF0
L + ¸b + ¹1 ¡ ¹2 = 0 (5)
L¹1 ´ w ¸ 0;¹1 ¸ 0;¹1w = 0 (6)
L¹2 ´ (1 ¡ w) ¸ 0;¹2 ¸ 0;¹2(1 ¡ w) = 0 (7)
LI ´ ½¸ ¡ _ ¸ = (1 ¡ Á(w))UcF(1 ¡ w)AI ¡ ±¸ (8)
L¸ ´ _ I = bw ¡ ±I (9)
Following the Mangasarian su±ciency theorem, the necessary conditions
of the maximum principle (5) - (9), are also su±cient for global maximiza-
tion i® Áww · 0 and AII · 0 (See appendix A for more details).
Analytical solutions require explicit functions to be chosen. Taking an
economy with linear production function Yt = A(1¡wt); linear utility func-
tion U(Ct) = Ct, and linear corruption technology Á(wt) = ·(1 ¡ wt) with
0 < · < 1, where the parameter · can be de¯ned as the capacity of govern-
ment to create rent, we can see that the consumption function is quadratic
in w and the state equation is linear in w. We have re¯ned the popular Lin-
ear Quadratic Di®erential Game. Total factor productivity is modelled as a
function of the institutional quality and other variables zt such that there
exists positive interaction between the z variables and governance quality
in the economy: At = zt(A0 + It) for A0 > 0. These functional forms help
analytical tractability.
If civil society chooses to voice i.e w 6= 0, the FOCs can be solved tech-
nically for an interior solution. An interior solution w¤ 2]0;1[ exists i® the
inequality constraints gi(w¤) are not binding: gi(w¤) > 0 8 i = 1;2 and
complementary-slackness conditions given by ¹1w = 0 and ¹2(1 ¡ w) = 0,
respectively in conditions (6) and (7) imply that ¹1 = ¹2 = 0. Solving (5)
- (9) for an interior optimal solution, given the explicit functions above, we
¯nd the following system
(2·(1 ¡ w) ¡ 1)A + ¸b = 0 (10)
_ ¸ = (± + ½)¸ ¡ (1 ¡ ·(1 ¡ w))(1 ¡ w)z (11)
_ I = bw ¡ ±I (12)
7For simplicity, time subscripts are dropped
8Proposition 1 (Existence of the equilibrium): There exists at least
one solution 0 < w¤ < 1 for A0 small enough.
Proof: The Euler equation (10) gives us the e®ort-setting equation and
can be rewritten as
2·z(A0 + I)w ¡ ¸b ¡ (2· ¡ 1)z(A0 + I) = 0 (13)
Let us denote the Left Hand Side of (13) by F(w) and apply the In-
termediate Values Theorem to the interval [0;1]. By de¯nition, if F is a
continuous function on the interval [0;1] and if the condition F(0)F(1) 6 0
is veri¯ed, then the equation F(w) = 0 has at least one solution on the same
interval. From the dynamic system of Equations (11) and (12), we have the
following steady state values
¸¤ =







Using equations (13) - (15) we can easily show that F(1) = z(A0+ b
±) > 0
and F(0) = ¡¸b = ¡
(1 ¡ ·)z
(± + ½)




. Thus, F(0)F(1) < 0. ¥
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium):
The system of Equations (10)-(12) admits a unique stable saddlepoint
equilibrium (w¤;I¤;¸¤) in the space (I;¸).
Proof :
By plugging Equations (14) and (15) into Equation (13) and rearrang-
ing, we obtain the following optimal civil monitoring:
w¤ =






¡4b·±(3± + 2½)(b(· ¡ 1) ¡ A0(2· ¡ 1)(± + ½)) + (¡2A0±· + b(2· ¡ 1)(2± + ½))2
9Plugging Equation (16) into Equations (15) and (14) gives the steady
states values I¤ and ¸¤ respectively in terms of the model's parameters.
Let us now study the stability of this equilibrium. The dynamic system
of Equations (11) - (12) can be rewritten as
_ I = b
(2· ¡ 1)A + ¸b
2A·
¡ ±I (17)
_ ¸ = (± + ½)¸ ¡ (1 ¡ ·(1 ¡ w))(1 ¡ w)z (18)




2·z(A0 + I¤)2 ¡ ±
b2
2·z(A0 + I¤)
0 (± + ½)
1
A
Since this Jacobian matrix is triangular, the two eigenvalues are (± + ½)
and ¡
¸¤b2
2·z(A0 + I¤)2 ¡ ±, which have opposite signs. Then the interior so-
lution (w¤;I¤;¸¤) is a local stable saddlepoint. ¥
The dynamic optimization problem above should admit two corner so-
lutions w¤ = 0 and w¤ = 1. However w¤ = 1 is excluded by construction
since production would be equal to zero and thus so would consumption.
Let us explore the only possible case w¤ = 0. If the model admits the corner
solution of zero optimal e®ort, this implies that civil society is loyal i.e does
nothing in ¯ght against corruption. Under this hypothesis, the inequality
constraint g1(w) is binding i.e g1(w¤) = 0 with w = 0;¹1 > 0 and ¹1w = 0
Proposition 3 (Existence and stability of the corner solution):
The corner regime displays one stable saddlepoint solution of zero optimal
e®ort, i® · <
A0(± + ½) ¡ b
2A0(± + ½) ¡ b
. For A0 small enough, the corner solution
exists and is stable for any · 2]0;1[
Proof:
According to the Khun-Tucker conditions (5) - (9), after imposing w¤ = 0
and ¹2 = 0, the Euler equation (10) becomes
(2· ¡ 1)zA0 + ¸b + ¹1 = 0 (19)





10Plugging Equation (20) into Equation (19) gives
¹¤




From Equation (21), it follows that ¹¤
1 > 0 i® · <
A0(± + ½) ¡ b
2A0(± + ½) ¡ b
.
Furthermore, the Jacobian matrix associated with this corner solution









0 (± + ½)
1
A





and (±+½) have opposite signs. Thus, the corner stationary solution of zero
optimal e®ort is a stable saddlepoint. ¥
2.2 Active civil society versus oppressive government
We can construct a theoretical Nash game in which active civil society faces
an authoritarian government. Consider a two-agent di®erential game in
which time is continuous, the game is played on the in¯nite horizon. Recall
that the government seeks, per unit of output Yt, current rent Át = Át(x;w)
depending negatively on the e®ort w and positively on the pressure x it
exerts on civil society: Áx > 0 and Áw < 0 as in the previous case. However,
the government incurs the cost of implementing and enforcing sanctioning
mechanisms. Let g(x) denotes the cost function which is increasing and con-
vex: gx > 0 and gxx ¸ 0. As previously, a representative consumer receives
the amount (1 ¡ Á(x;w)) per unit of output Yt.
Government's objective is to maximize the present value of its bene¯ts
from corruption minus the expenses devoted to punishment mechanisms.
We assume that the discount factor½ > 0 is the same for both agents. Then,




0 exp(¡½t)[U(Gt) ¡ g(xt)]dt subject to Equation (1)
where Gt is the total amount of corruption and Gt = Á(xt;wt)Yt.
For a representative consumer:
11Maxwt
R 1
0 exp(¡½t)U(Ct)dt subject to Equation (1)
This is the same as Regime 1, except that corruption Á depends also on
governmental hostility x.
The current value Hamiltonian associated with the Government's opti-
mization problem is
H(xt;It;´t) = U(Á(xt;wt)Yt) ¡ g(xt) + ´(bwt ¡ ±It)
where ´ is the costate variable
The necessary optimality conditions are given by:
Hx ´ UGÁxY ¡ gx = 0 (22)
HI ´ ½´ ¡ _ ´ = UGÁAIF(L) ¡ ±´ (23)
H´ ´ _ I = bwt ¡ ±I (24)
The Mangasarian su±ciency theorem for the maximum principle (22) - (24)
holds i® Áxx · 0 (see Appendix B). The method of resolution of the con-
sumer's problem is identical to the preceding case.
De¯nition 1: A pair of strategies (¹ x; ¹ w) is an open-loop Nash equilib-
rium if the two strategies simultaneously maximize the dynamic optimiza-
tion problems above. In other words, if the necessary optimality conditions
of the optimal control problems hold simultaneously.
To get the open-loop Nash equilibrium, it is enough to solve the system
of Equations (5) and (22). We consider the following quadratic preferences
for government:





where ® and ¯ are real numbers and ¯ captures the government's aversion
to rent variations. Furthermore, we restrict ourselves to the convex cost
function for implementing punishment mechanisms and a linear corruption






Á(xt;wt) = ·(1 ¡ wt + xt) (27)
As in the previous case, we take a linear utility function for consumers .
12Solving the Equations (5) and (22) respectively for x and w yields
x =
®·A(1 ¡ w) ¡ ¯·2A2(1 ¡ w)3
1 + ¯·2A2(1 ¡ w)2 (28)
w =
(2· ¡ 1 + ·x)A + ¸b
2A·
(29)
From Equation (28), we can easily deduce that x is positive i® ¯ <
®
·A(1 ¡ w)2. Plugging Equation (28) into Equation (29) and solving for w,
we obtain the following sixth-order polynomial in w:
A·f¯·A(1¡w)2[·A(1¡w)¡(¸b+(2·¡1)A)]+2w(1+¯·2A2(1¡w)2)¡®·A(1¡w)g¡¸b¡(2·¡1)A = 0
(30)
Proposition 4: There exists at least one Open-loop Nash equilibrium ( ¹ w; ¹ x)
such that 0 < ¹ w < 1 for A0 small enough. Furthermore, for ¯ small enough
this solution is unique and displays a stable saddle point.
Proof: Let us denote by P(w) the Left Hand Side (LHS) of the Equa-
tion (30). Using the Intermediate Values Theorem, we can easily show that
P(0)P(1) < 0 which ensures the existence of at least one solution 0 < ¹ w < 1.
Indeed, computing all the FOCs of the two problems above yields the
following dynamical system:
_ I = b(
(2· ¡ 1 + ·x)A + ¸b
2A·
) ¡ ±I (31)
_ ¸ = (± + ½)¸ ¡ z(1 ¡ ·(1 ¡ w + x))(1 ¡ w) (32)
_ ´ = (± + ½)´ + ¯Á2z2(A0 + I)(1 ¡ w)2 ¡ ®Áz(1 ¡ w) (33)
At steady state, _ ¸ = _ ´ = _ I = 0 implying that
¹ ´ =








z(1 ¡ ·(1 ¡ ¹ w + ¹ x))(1 ¡ ¹ w)
(± + ½)
(36)
On the one hand, setting w = 1 implies that ¹ x = ¹ ¸ = 0 and ¹ I = b
±. On















Note that for A0 small enough, ¹ x = 0 and ¹ ¸ =
(1¡·)z
(±+½) . Computing
P(1)andP(0) we ¯nd that P(1) = A = z(A0+b
±) > 0 and P(0) = ¡b
(1¡·)z
(±+½) <
0 implying that P(0)P(1) < 0.
Let us now study the uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium. For ¯
small enough, the LHS of Equation (30) is reduced to the following third-
order polynomial in w:
2A·w ¡ ®·2A2(1 ¡ w) ¡ ¸b ¡ (2· ¡ 1)A = 0 (37)
After plugging Equation (36) into equation (37), and replacing the TFP
by its expression and providing some transformations, the Polynomial (37)
can be rewritten as follows:
®z·2
± ((± +½)b





± + (1 ¡ 2·) + ®z·2 b
±]w + · ¡ 1 = 0
This third-order polynomial displays three solutions, two of which are
complex and one is a real root which is not easily interpretable. For ¯ and
A0 small enough, the jacobian matrix J(I¤;¸¤;´¤) associated with the dy-










0 (± + ½) 0




The Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state is a triangular matrix




º2 = º3 = (± + ½). We conclude that the dimension of the stable manifold
i.e the number of eigenvalues with negative real parts is equal to one. Thus,
the unique Open-loop Nash equilibrium is a stable saddle point. ¥
3 Cooperative arrangement
Let us now consider the case when civil society and government agree to
cooperate. Under a cooperative arrangement players seek a set of strategies
14that ensure a Pareto optimal solution. The objective function to be maxi-
mized is the weighted sum of the two payo®s:
maxw;x[
R 1
0 exp(¡½t)f¼[U(Gt)¡g(xt)]+(1¡¼)U(Ct)gdt subject to (1)
with 0 < ¼ < 1
where ¼ is the cooperation weight of the government. The augmented
lagrangian function can be written as:
L = ¼[U(Gt)¡g(xt)]+(1¡¼)U(Ct)+¸t(bwt¡±It)+¹1twt+¹1t(1¡wt) (38)
Computing the FOCs for interior solutions yields
A[¡1 + ¼ + (¡2 + 2w ¡ x)°1 ¡ °2(¡1 + w)(¡1 + w ¡ x)(2(¡1 + w) ¡ x)] + ¸b = 0(39)
¡x + Ã1(¡1 + w) + Ã2(1 ¡ w)2(1 ¡ w + x) = 0(40)
_ ¸ = µ1(¡1 + w)2(1 ¡ w + x)2 ¡ (¡1 + w)z(¡1 + ¼ + (¡1 + w ¡ x)µ2) + (± + ½)¸(41)
_ I = bw ¡ ±I(42)
with
°1 = (¡1 + ¼(1 + ®)· and °2 = A¼¯·2
Ã1 = A®· and Ã2 = A2¯·2
µ1 = ¼A¯z(·)2 and µ2 = °2 = (¡1 + ¼(1 + ®))·
De¯nition 2: ( ¹ w; ¹ x) is a pair of pareto strategy if it solves the system
of Equations (39)-(40) given the dynamic Equations (41) and (42).
Proposition 5: For A0 small enough and ¼ < 1
®+1, there exists at least
one solution 0 < w¤ < 1
Proof: Solving Equation (40) for x, we get
x =
A(¡1 + w)·(1 ¡ ¼(1 + ®) + A¼(¡1 + w)2¯·)
¼(1 + A2(¡1 + w)2¯·2)
(43)
Plugging Equation (43) into Equation (39), we obtain an eight-order
polynomial P(w) = 0. We can study the existence of w¤ 2 [0;1] by applying







15we can easily show that P(1) = ¡z(A0+ b
±)(1¡¼) < 0. Furthermore, for
A0 small enough P(0) = ¡
zb(1 ¡ · + ¼(¡1 + · + ®·))
(± + ½)
> 0 i® · · 1¡¼
1¡¼(®+1).
Since 0 < · < 1, the last condition requires that ¼ < 1
®+1. Thus, under
the condition ¼ < 1
®+1; P(0) > 0 and by the Intermediate Values Theorem,
P(0)P(1) < 0, implying that there exists at least one solution 0 < w¤ < 1. ¥
Proposition 6: For ¯ small enough, the Pareto strategy (w¤;x¤) is
uniquely determined and the associated stationary solution is a stable saddle
point.
Proof:
Imposing ¯ and A0 small enough, the eight-order polynomial becomes
the third-order polynomial in w
P(w) = '1w3 + '2w2 + '3w + '4 (44)
where
'1 =
b·(¼(1 + ®) ¡ 1)[±3¼ + b·(¼(1 + ®) ¡ 1)]
±2¼
'2 =
2b·(¼(1 + ®) ¡ 1)[1 ¡ ±2] + ¼±3
±
'3 =
±¼[b(¼ ¡ 1)(2± + ½) ¡ 2±2¼(± + ½)] + b·(¼(1 + ®) ¡ 1)[(± + ½)±3¼ ¡ b·(¼(1 + ®) ¡ 1)]
(± + ½)±3¼
'4 =
¼±3(± + ½) ¡ b(¼ ¡ 1)± ¡ 2b·(± + ½)(¼(1 + ®) ¡ 1)
±(± + ½)
Solving Equation (44) for w, we obtain one real solution and two complex
ones. The complex solutions have to be excluded but the analytical form of
the real solution is not easily interpretable.
Let us now study the stability of the unique cooperative outcome. The
Jacobian matrix associated to the dynamic system in Equations (41)-(42)
and evaluated at steady state can be written as
0
@ ¡± + J11
¡b
2·z(A0 + ¹ I)(¡1 + ¼(1 + ®))





2¼ + b¹ ¸
2z(A0+¹ I)2(¡1+¼(1+®))· < 0
This triangular matrix has one negative eigenvalue J11¡± and one posi-
tive eigenvalue (±+½). Thus, the pair of Pareto strategy (w¤;x¤) is a stable
saddle point. ¥
164 Robustness numerical assessment
We assess numerically the analytical results obtained in the above three
regime (namely the simple optimal control when an active civil society faces
a passive government, the open-loop Nash equilibrium characterizing the
outcome of the interaction between active civil society and oppressive gov-
ernment, and the cooperative outcome).
4.1 Calibration
The parameters of the model are calibrated according to the conditions to be
met for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in all three regimes.
Table 1: Calibration of parameters
Parameter ± b A0 ½ ® ¯ ¼ z
Value 0.1 0.5 0.001 0.98 0.5 0.002 0.6 1
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Below we consider two examples: a variation of · and a variation of ¯, other
factors remaining unchanged.
For di®erent values of · such that 0 < · < 1 with others factors un-
changed, it can be shown graphically that there exists a unique optimal
e®ort w¤ 2]0;1[ and this increases as · increases.( see Figures 1 and 2).
The impact of an increase of · on civil monitoring and output is computed
for the three regimes. As a corollary, the speed of convergence to the long
run equilibrium which is the modulus of the negative (stable) eigenvalue is




2·z(A0 + I¤)2 ¡ ±
À2 = ¡± ¡
¸¤·z
2
and À3 = ¡± + J11
where J11 =
¡( ¹ w¡1)z(¡1+¼(1+®))·
2¼ + b¹ ¸
2z(A0+¹ I)2(¡1+¼(1+®))· < 0
17Table 2: Active civil society versus passive government (Regime
1)
· w¤ I¤ ¸¤ y¤ À1
0.05 0.088 0.442 0.806 0.404 -10.353
0.1 0.093 0.465 0.764 0.423 -4.488
0.2 0.106 0.528 0.680 0.473 -1.617
0.4 0.158 0.791 0.517 0.666 -0.730
0.5 0.210 1.051 0.442 0.831 -0.200
0.7 0.352 1.761 0.328 1.141 -0.119
0.75 0.386 1.931 0.307 1.186 -0.114
0.9 0.474 2.372 0.256 1.247 -0.106
Table 2 the following economic implications: as · increases, both the
optimal e®ort and the optimal output also increase. Then, given our cal-
ibration above, the indirect positive e®ect of w on y (TFP e®ects) always
dominates the negative direct e®ect.
Table 3: Active civil society versus oppressive government
(Regime 2)
· w¤ I¤ ¸¤ y¤ À2
0.05 0.088 0.442 0.805 0.404 -10.348
0.1 0.093 0.465 0.762 0.423 -4.476
0.2 0.106 0.530 0.672 0.475 -1.590
0.4 0.168 0.843 0.471 0.702 -0.306
0.5 0.256 1.279 0.351 0.953 -0.153
0.7 0.525 2.625 0.159 1.247 -0.104
0.75 0.577 2.885 0.133 1.221 -0.103
0.9 0.691 3.454 0.083 1.068 -0.101
The steady state values given in Table 3 illustrates that as · increases,
civil monitoring will always increase. However, there exists a threshold value
·¤ at which the indirect positive e®ect of institutional improvement (TFP
e®ects) and direct detrimental e®ect of civil monitoring on output totally
compensate. For all · < ·¤ optimal output will always increase, meaning
that positive TFP e®ects dominate the negative civil monitoring e®ect. For
all · > ·¤ the negative civil monitoring e®ect dominates and output will
always decrease with ·. After several iterations ·¤ = 0:70 (see Figure 3).
18Table 4: Cooperative play (Regime 3)
· w¤ I¤ ¸¤ y¤ À3
0.05 0.085 0.427 0.333 0.392 -90.935
0.1 0.086 0.432 0.294 0.324 -43.359
0.2 0.088 0.442 0.274 0.297 -19.024
0.4 0.093 0.465 0.269 0.200 -5.880
0.45 0.094 0.472 0.252 0.166 -4.261
In Regime 3, the optimal e®ort always increases with · while the op-
timal output always decreases with ·. This implies that indirect positive
e®ect (TFP e®ect) is dominated by the negative direct e®ect of w on y. Fur-
thermore, as · approaches 0:5, the cooperation scenario is not pro¯table to
consumers since the amount of corruption per unit of production approaches
one and consumption tends to zero. This analysis is therefore restricted to
cases where · < 0:5.
In summary, the numerical assessment indicates that
¢w¤
¢·
> 0 for all
regimes. The indirect positive e®ect of civil monitoring on output always
dominates its detrimental e®ect in Regime 1 and 8· < ·¤ = 0:7 in Regime
2, while the reverse is true in regime 3 for all ·. The speed of convergence
decreases substantially with the increase of · in all three regimes. Further-
more, comparing the two moods of the game, we see that the cooperative
regime displays much faster convergence than the competitive regimes.
The second case involves a simple variation of ¯ in two di®erent situa-
tions when · is either small or large. Note that the parameter ¯ does not
enter the model of Regime 1 in which there is no government. So we study
the local impact of a small variation of ¯ in Regime 2 and Regime 3. If · is
small (Let us take · = 0:05) and the remaining parameters stay unchanged,
the variations of ¯ are insu±cient to modify the optimal civil monitoring
and consequently, the optimal output and level of institutional quality index.
The steady state values remain unchanged. In the Figure 4, we graphically
illustrate the null impact of a simple variation of ¯ on the optimal e®ort of
civil society. The interesting case is when · is high. To be in line with the
¯rst numerical example involving a simple variation of ·, we take · = 0:45
Table 5: E®ect of variation of ¯ in Regime 2 with high ·
¯ w¤ I¤ ¸¤ y¤ À2
0.003 0.204 1.021 0.412 0.814 -0.210
0.3 0.199 0.993 0.415 0.797 -0.216
0.5 0.196 0.978 0.416 0.787 -0.221
19It can easily be shown that an increase of ¯, other factors staying un-
changed, will decrease the optimal civil monitoring (even if the impact is
small as reported in Figure 5) and the optimal level of institutional qual-
ity index. The change in institutional quality indirectly lowers the output
through the TFP e®ects, while the change in the optimal civil monitoring
means that more labor is devoted to the production sector ( which in turn
enhances the output). The steady state value of the output decreases as ¯
increases, thus the TFP e®ects always dominate.
Table 6: E®ects of variation of ¯ in Regime 3 with high ·
¯ w¤ I¤ ¸¤ y¤ À3
0.003 0.094 0.472 0.323 0.428 -5.304
0.3 0.099 0.497 0.266 0.448 -3.987
0.5 0.103 0.517 0.241 0.465 -3.353
In this case the civil monitoring, the institutional quality and the out-
put all increase with the positive variation of ¯ coupled with the high scale
factor of corruption ·. Again, the TFP e®ects dominates. Figure 6 exhibits
the variation of e®ort w associated with a variation of ¯. Comparing the
speed of convergence to the long run equilibrium, we realize that it is always
greater in a cooperative regime than in a competitive one.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the dynamic interaction between civil society and
government in a representative developing country. We distinguished three
regimes: the interaction between an active or loyal civil society and pas-
sive government; an active civil society and an oppressive government; and
the cooperative arrangement. We demonstrated analytically that all three
regimes display a unique stable equilibrium (interior solution). In the ¯rst
regime, the corner solution of zero e®ort may occur if civil society chooses
to be loyal. The numerical experiments indicate that in three regimes, the
higher the scale factor of corruption in the economy, the bigger the civil mon-
itoring. Civil monitoring is low and the speed of convergence to the long
run equilibrium is always faster in the cooperative regime. Furthermore,
the total factor productivity e®ects always dominate the direct detrimental
e®ect of civil society on production in Regime 1 and for · < 0:7 in Regime
2. The reverse case appears under cooperation. The change in the aversion
parameter of rental variations is neutral if the scale of corruption is too low
in the that sense it does not modify the civil monitoring and consequently
output. However, an increase in the averse parameter of variations of rent
coupled with high governmental capacity of creating rent will decrease civil
20monitoring in Regime 2. Conversely, it will increase civil monitoring in
Regime 3. TFP e®ects will always dominate.
Our results are based on open-loop strategies. A further issue will be
to characterize the feedback outcome strategies of this di®erential game,
ensuring that optimal solution is a subgame perfect equilibrium which guar-
antees the time consistency property despite the possible loss of analytical
tractability.
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0 exp(¡½t)U(Ct)dt, subject to Equation (1)
with 0 · wt · 1
Let us denote the utility function U(C(w;I)) by M(w;I) and the state equa-
tion by _ I = f(w;I) since the control variable is w and the state variable
is I. Then, the current value hamiltonian and the augmented lagrangian
function can be respectively written as
H = M(w;I) + ¸f(w;I)
and
L = M(w;I) + ¸f(w;I) + ¹1twt + ¹2t(1 ¡ wt)
By de¯nition, necessary conditions of the Maximum Principle (5)-(9) are
also su±cient under the Mangasarian su±ciency theorem i® both M
and f are Joint Concave in (w;I) and ¸(t) ¸ 0;8t. In other words, H is
concave in (w;I) i.e the Hessian Matrix associated to H is de¯nite negative.
Following Chiang Alpha (1992), we don't need to check the condition on
¸ since the function f is linear in w and in I. Furthermore, the constraint
quali¯cation is satis¯ed since the inequality constraint, gi for i = (1;2), are
all linear in w. For our case, we have to verify only the concavity condition
of the function M with respect to w and I. Preliminary, we have:
Mw = ¡UcA(ÁwF + (1 ¡ Á(w))FL)
MI = Uc(1 ¡ Á(w))FAI






Mww = Ucc[A(ÁwF + (1 ¡ Á(w))FL)]2 ¡ UcA[ÁwwF ¡ 2ÁwFL ¡ (1 ¡
Á(w))FLL]
MwI = MIw = ¡(Ucc(1 ¡ Á(w))AIF ¡ UcAI)(ÁwF + (1 ¡ Á(w))FL)
MII = ¡Ucc[(1 ¡ Á(w))AIF]2 + Uc(1 ¡ Á(w))FAII
According to a standard utility function U(C) and a standard production
function, we can conclude that Mww < 0 i® Áww > 0 and MII < 0 i®
AII 6 0. Furthermore, we see that MwwMII ¡ (MwI)2 > 0, meaning that
the discriminant is positive. Thus, the hessian matrix above is de¯nite





0 exp(¡½t)[U(Gt) ¡ g(xt)]dt subject to Equation (1)
where Gt = Á(xt;wt)Yt.
The current hamiltonian associated to the control problem of the Gov-
ernment is
H = U(Á(xt;wt)Yt)¡g(xt)+´(bwt¡±It) where ´ is the costate variable
The necessary conditions (22) - (24) are su±cient for maximum princi-
ple i® H is concave in (x;I) meaning that the associated hessian matrix is






Hxx = UGG(Áxy)2 + UGÁxxy ¡ gxx
HII = UGG(ÁAIF)2 + UGÁAIIF
HIx = HxI = (UGGÁAF + UG)ÁxAIF
With the convex cost function g(x) and a standard utility function U(G),
it can easily be shown that Hxx < 0 i® Áxx 6 0 and HII < 0 i® AII 6 0.
Furthermore, the relation HxxHII ¡ (HIx)2 > 0 is veri¯ed. Then, the hes-
sian matrix associated to H is de¯nite negative meaning that the FOCs (23)




























Civil monitoring eﬀect dominates
1 0
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Figure 3: At ·¤, TFP e®ects and civil monitoring e®ects totally compensate
in Regime 2
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Figure 6: Variation of ¯ when · is high in Regime 3
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